"We're in a risky business..."

I want to alert everybody to a very serious story that was broadcast on ABC News, only a week ago.

It didn't get much attention in Canada and we have skin in the game.

Two former top NASA engineers say Artemis 2 isn't safe and there's a good chance the astronauts will be killed… pic.twitter.com/JakW9sQV7o

— Michael Gerald Gibbs🏳️‍🌈🍁 🇺🇦 (He/Him) (@Mikeggibbs) February 6, 2026

NGL, I read this mostly as breathless scaremongering like some of those AI posts that I've been annoyed by.  That said, there are indeed millions of things that can go wrong, including Orion's heat shield, that could kill the crew.  It is good to ask questions from a place of informed concern; when we stop doing that, we all can fall prey to Go Fever.

One commenter pointed to a CBC article about the heat shield, which I want to touch on:

During the Artemis I mission in 2022, the first test flight of the Orion capsule with no humans on board, engineers were shocked to see large cracks and chunks missing from the protective heat shield that lines the bottom of the capsule. The capsule itself remained intact, and had there been people aboard, they would have been safe. But this was a concerning issue because the failure of the heat shield ultimately doomed space shuttle Columbia.

Yes, Columbia disintegrated upon re-entry because thermal protection failed, but I just want to get a little nitpicky because in that case, the failure was caused by significant damage from insulating foam falling from the external tank.  I mention this because the problem was inherent to the Shuttle, which had many such incidents that did not lead to disaster, going back to STS-1, so it suggests more about issues with design, implementation, and management decisions back then, rather than any fatuous connection between the two platforms simply due to "heat shield" concerns.

Fortunately, after Columbia new operational procedures (along with some updated hardware and contingency planning) were adopted to mitigate the risk, and the program operated with no further accidents (I won't go so far as to suggest "safely").  NASA's also adjusting in response to Artemis I:

Artemis I actually entered the Earth’s atmosphere twice. Like a stone skipping across water, the capsule dipped down into the upper layers of air to slow down, then skipped back into space before dropping down again at a steeper angle for final descent to the Pacific Ocean. This double bounce allows for more control during re-entry and a more precise landing.

It is now believed that the first entry caused the bubbles to form and the second heating event made them burst.

In a news conference in December 2024, NASA announced that for Artemis II, Orion will enter the atmosphere directly, with no skip back into space. This is expected to reduce the amount of time the heat shield is exposed to the hot plasma. 

Extensive testing that was done on heat shield materials in high speed wind tunnels and plasma labs has convinced managers and the crew that the shield will perform properly and protect everyone inside during this upcoming flight.

And just this month, newly-appointed NASA administrator Jared Isaacman said he had “full confidence” in the plan, after a meeting with engineers, spaceflight officials, and outside experts.

I am not sanguine about the risks, but I also don't believe for a moment that NASA isn't taking them seriously.  And this red flag in the original tweet is a red flag for me in a different sense:

A big red flag: the same people are in charge when Columbia's heat shield failed.

Which people are they, exactly?  It strikes me highly unlikely that it's all the same managers who made decisions 23 years ago, but if that's a concern, why no specific person(s) being called out?  That's usually a tell that the poster is just channeling Charlie Day and not truly informed.

For instance, the previous Orion program manager was Catherine Koerner, who was a shuttle flight director after Columbia, while the current manager, Howard Hu, was promoted to the role in '22.  Both have long careers at NASA, but were not the ones calling shots in '03.

Hu, BTW, is a graduate of the University of Washington, I've come to learn.  He is also a contemporary, so I am sure he remembers both shuttle accidents vividly, and is an engineer dedicated to crew safety and mission success.

Still, it's always good to remember what Feynman wrote in the wake of Challenger:

There are several references to flights that had gone before. The acceptance and success of these flights is taken as evidence of safety. But erosion and blow-by are not what the design expected. They are warnings that something is wrong. The equipment is not operating as expected, and therefore there is a danger that it can operate with even wider deviations in this unexpected and not thoroughly understood way. 

The fact that this danger did not lead to a catastrophe before is no guarantee that it will not the next time, unless it is completely understood. When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next. 

If NASA were still caught in the same cognitive trap, accepting something risky without understanding and addressing it, then I'd be more concerned about Artemis II.  The managers and engineers, however, appear to have made changes based on what they learned from Artemis I, so I'm more inclined to think there are 2,999,999 other parts that could go wrong before the heat shield causes problems.

Selah.

PS - Post title is borrowed from Gus Grissom.